Toelichting bij COM(2023)533 - Proposal for a REGULATION OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL on combating late payment in commercial transactions - Hoofdinhoud
Dit is een beperkte versie
U kijkt naar een beperkte versie van dit dossier in de EU Monitor.
| dossier | COM(2023)533 - Proposal for a REGULATION OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL on combating late payment in commercial transactions. |
|---|---|
| bron | COM(2023)533  |
| datum | 12-09-2023 |
•Reasons for and objectives of the proposal
Every year, around 18 billion invoices are issued in the EU, more than 500 every second 1 . Reliable payment streams are necessary to make the EU economy, and especially small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), more competitive.
Goods and services are often supplied on deferred payments: the supplier (the creditor) grants the client (the debtor) a payment term to pay the invoice (trade credit), after the goods are delivered or the service agreed on in the contract is provided. Late payments are payments not made within the agreed or legal term. They affect companies in all sectors 2 and all Member States 3 and, to a disproportionate degree, severely affect SMEs 4 .
The root cause of late payments is asymmetries in bargaining power between a large client (debtor) and a smaller supplier (creditor). This often results in the supplier’s having to accept unfair payment terms and conditions. For debtors, paying late is an attractive form of finance that costs the debtor nothing but does have a cost for the creditor. This is compounded by the inadequacy of the current EU legal framework, Directive 2011/7/EU (the Late Payment Directive), which lacks sufficient preventive measures and suitable deterrents, and whose enforcement and redress mechanisms are insufficient 5 .
The revision of the Late Payment Directive addresses these shortcomings, with the ultimate aims of improving the payment discipline of all concerned actors (public authorities, large companies and SMEs) and protecting companies from the negative effects of payment delays in commercial transactions.
The revision of the Late Payment Directive has been included in the Commission 2023 work programme under the objective ‘A Europe fit for the Digital Age’.
•Consistency with existing policy provisions in the policy area
Improving payment behaviour in commercial transactions is one of the objectives of the Commission Communications Updating the 2020 New Industrial Strategy 6 and an SME Strategy for a sustainable and digital Europe 7 . The revision also follows up on the recommendations issued by the Fit for Future Platform in the Opinion adopted in December 2021 8 and the Resolution of the European Parliament of 2019 9 . This initiative also contributes to the objectives of the Communication “Long-term competitiveness of the EU: looking beyond 2030” 10 . This revision in fact aims to bring fairness in commercial transactions, increase the resilience of SMEs and supply chains, foster a more widespread use of digitalisation and improve financial literacy of entrepreneurs. The Late Payment Directive is part of the REFIT Scoreboard 11 .
•Consistency with other Union policies
The Late Payment Directive is closely linked to the Directive on unfair trading practices in business to business (B2B) relationships in the agricultural and food supply chain (the UTP Directive). The legal relationship between the two texts is explained in recitals 17 and 18 and Article 3(1) of the UTP Directive. The UTP Directive does not impinge on the rules, remedies and consequences laid down in the Late Payment Directive. Nor do the provisions of the Late Payment Directive impinge on the rules applicable in the agri-food sector to value-sharing agreements, payments in the context of the school scheme, or certain payments in the sale of grapes, must and wine in bulk in the wine sector.
The Late Payment Directive regulates payments in commercial transactions between contracting authorities and main contractors and between contractors and their subcontractors. Article 71 (3) of Directive 2014/24/EU and Article 88(7) of Directive 2014/25/EU on public procurement provide for the possibility for the Member States to lay down provisions on direct payments to subcontractors.
Inhoudsopgave
- 2.LEGAL BASIS, SUBSIDIARITY AND PROPORTIONALITY
- 3.RESULTS OF EX-POST EVALUATIONS, STAKEHOLDER CONSULTATIONS AND IMPACT ASSESSMENTS
- Capping payment terms at 30 days in B2B transactions
- EU Member States to address the question of unfair contractual terms and practices through their national law
- 4.BUDGETARY IMPLICATIONS
- 5.OTHER ELEMENTS
•Legal basis
Article 114 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) is the appropriate legal basis for this initiative to achieve its objectives. Article 114 TFEU is the appropriate legal basis for measures aimed at achieving the objectives set out in Article 26 TFEU (harmonising national provisions).
EU action is required to ensure that all Member States have the minimum rules in place to prevent late payments, have the right enforcement and deterrent measures to combat late payments in place, and have adequate means of redress. In this context, the targeted EU intervention by means of this proposal is in line with the principle of subsidiarity.
The current Late Payment Directive is a recast of the first Late Payment Directive (Directive 2000/35/EC), based on Article 95 of the Treaty Establishing the European Community. Its revision is therefore within the joint remit (shared competence) of the EU and its Member States’ governments.
•Subsidiarity (for non-exclusive competence)
Late payment affects all Member States. Facilitating prompt payment requires strict and coordinated rules. Implementing 27 national solutions would likely result in a lack of uniform rules, fragmentation of the single market and higher costs for companies trading across borders. EU action is justified because late payment affects all commercial transactions in public procurement and between companies, regardless of their size. As a revision of existing EU legislation to strengthen its provisions, it can only be done at EU level.
EU action is required to set out provisions on interest and compensation fees, establish clearer payment terms for B2B transactions; set out enforcement and monitoring provisions, ensure that there are synergies in place with the public procurement framework.
•Proportionality
The planned initiative will not go beyond what is necessary to achieve its objectives. It imposes on companies only the cost necessary to achieve those objectives and serve the immediate needs of the people it is intended for (e.g., companies, in particular SMEs) to prevent late payment and bring about prompt payment.
•Choice of the instrument
The instrument chosen is a Regulation, to replace the current Late Payment Directive. A Regulation has numerous advantages, including tackling the cross-border aspect of late payment. With a Regulation, key aspects, such as the maximum term for payments and verification procedures, the rate of interest for late payments and the amount of flat fee compensation, will be the same throughout the EU and directly applicable. At the same time, Member States will be allowed to adopt more stringent provisions on certain aspects. The Regulation lays down obligations regarding enforcement bodies, mediation systems, credit management, financial literacy training and unfair contractual practices and provisions, but it would be for the Member States to complement them according to their national legislation. The new Regulation would also incorporate the provisions of the Late Payment Directive not affected by the revision.
•Ex-post evaluations/fitness checks of existing legislation
In 2015, an ex-post evaluation of the Late Payment Directive 12 assessed its relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, coherence, and EU added value. It concluded that the Directive was relevant and efficient and did not impose any significant costs on companies or public authorities. However, it also noted that fear of damaging commercial relations was stopping creditors who were paid late from asserting the rights the Directive gives them. The 2021 Opinion of the Fit for Future Platform 13 presented 10 recommendations on short- and long-term measures to address late payment. The short-term measures recommended include defining what grossly unfair practices and clauses mean; looking into reversing the burden of proof on the debtor to make it easier for creditors to prove there has been an abuse; encouraging SMEs to assert their rights by providing advice and information about payment terms, making payment terms transparent, and self-regulation. The long-term measures recommended include limiting contractual payment terms to a maximum of 30 days for payments from a large company to a SME, e-invoicing and governmental supervision.
•Stakeholder consultations
The Commission consulted a broad range of stakeholders, including Member State authorities, companies, in particular SMEs, EU and national business associations, private individuals and academic experts. The consultation activities included a call for evidence, a public consultation, a specific consultation of SMEs (SME Panel), bilateral interviews with key stakeholders and discussions with representatives of Member States. The information gained was used as input for the proposal.
The call for evidence received responses from 137 stakeholders and the public consultation received 117 responses between 12 January and 17 March 2023 14 . The SME Panel 15 took place between 26 January and 16 March 2023 and obtained 939 responses.
The Commission organised bilateral meetings with key stakeholders representing companies, in particular SMEs 16 . Late payment was also discussed on 21 March and 31 May 2023 during meetings of the SME Envoys Network. Two meetings were held with the late payment expert group 17 on 10 October 2022 and 13 January 2023. A large majority of stakeholders confirmed that late payments heavily affected companies, in particular SMEs.
Almost all consulted stakeholder groups expressed their support for revising the Directive. However, some stakeholders pointed out that stricter rules ran counter to the contractual freedom of European companies. Most stakeholders supported the option of capping the payment term in B2B transactions, with a preference for 30 days. Only a few stakeholders were against the idea of limiting payment terms. Many stakeholders supported the option to provide training on credit management and financial literacy and to establish a European Payment Observatory. It emerged from the consultation that interest on and compensation for late payments are rarely paid. Stakeholders were in favour of making the payment of interest automatic.
•Collection and use of expertise
In its collection and use of expertise, the Commission used the results of existing evaluations and reports: the Ex-post Evaluation of the Late Payment Directive 18 , the Commission Report to the European Parliament and to the Council on the implementation of the Late Payment Directive (and the supporting Staff Working Document) 19 , the European Parliament Resolution on the implementation of the Late Payment Directive 20 and the Opinion of the Fit for Future Platform on the Late Payment Directive 21 .
The results of studies and surveys were also considered: the European Payment Reports 22 , the SME Performance Reviews reports 23 , the JRC studies on Late Payments and Firms 24 and on Assessing the economic impact of faster payments in B2B transactions 25 , and the European Commission studies on B2B transactions 26 and on ‘Building a responsible payment culture’ 27 .
The Commission has also taken into account several recent European Court of Justice judgments. The proposed text of the regulation clarifies that flat fee compensation is due per invoice and not per contract, as established by the preliminary ruling in case C-585/20 of 20 October 2022 28 . In the same ruling the Court also clarified that the procedure of verification or acceptance of goods or services shall be included in the contract only if the nature of the goods or services warrants such a procedure. The proposed regulation also incorporates the judgment in Case C-122/18 of 28 January 2020 that the obligation imposed on Member States by the Directive pertains to the effective compliance by their public authorities with the payment terms it sets out 29 . Finally, it clarifies the date until late payment interests stop accruing, according to the preliminary ruling in case C-256/15 of 15 December 2016 30 .
•Impact assessment
The Regulatory Scrutiny Board examined the Impact Assessment report on 10 May 2023 and issued a positive opinion with reservations on 12 May 2023 31 . The Board’s recommendations were addressed in the final version of the Impact Assessment. The Impact Assessment analysed different policy options for achieving three specific objectives. Under the first objective, ‘to prevent late payment from occurring’, the policy measures identified (PO1) focus on the negotiation stage of a commercial transaction, because payment delays are often the result of undue or unfair payment terms in the contract. Different options for the maximum payment term in B2B transactions were assessed, including the maximum duration of the verification procedure to ascertain goods’ or services’ compliance with the contract requirements. The option of making credit management and financial literacy training more widely available to SMEs and making it easier for them to access them, as a preventive measure, was also assessed. Under the second objective, ‘to facilitate timely payments’, the policy measures identified (PO2) aim to combat late payment by ensuring that the rules on payment are enforced, and payment terms are respected, by making the payment of interest and compensation compulsory and reviewing the amount of flat fee compensation. Options relating to enforcement and synergies with public procurement procedures were also assessed. For the third objective ‘to strengthen redress mechanisms, ensure fair payment conditions and empower companies’, the policy measures identified (PO3) focus on fairness and the availability of effective redress mechanisms.
The preferred option: the assessment shows that each option has potential benefits but also carries some risks if implemented on its own. The preferred package of measures therefore brings together the most effective sub-options from PO1, PO2 and PO3. The package has several advantages compared to each policy option in isolation, and largely eliminates the inherent risks of each. Capping payment terms, as in PO1a, is likely to be significantly more effective when accompanied by strong enforcement measures and deterrents against paying late, as in PO2a. The dissuasive power of the automatic payment of interest and compensation will increase when the chance to circumvent these provisions by negotiating unfairly long payment terms is eliminated. Measures under PO3b will provide additional support for the package. The impact assessment conservatively assumes that a 35% reduction in late payment is realistic by adding together the reductions in payment delays of 23.4% from PO1, 17.8% from PO2, and 5.5% from PO3, assuming there is some overlap between the different options. The assessment of the option related to the form of the legal act concludes that a Regulation is the preferred form.
Preferred policy package 1a+2a+3b
Verification or acceptance procedure capped at 30 days (no derogation)
EU Member States facilitate availability of credit management and financial literacy training, including digital payment tools for SMEs.
Late payment interest is automatic (‘entitlement’ concept eliminated), the ending day for accrual of interest is clarified.
Flat fee compensation owed for each transaction paid late and increased to EUR 50 to reflect inflation.
EU Member States to designate bodies responsible for enforcing the law, carrying out investigations on their own initiative or through complaints, empowered to issue administrative sanctions and publish the name of offenders. Use of digital tools for more effective enforcement.
In public works contracts, contracting authorities and contracting entities must check that payment to the main contractor has been passed onto the direct subcontractors.
EU Member States to set up a national system of mediation to solve payment disputes in commercial transactions.
EU Member States to address the question of unfair contractual terms and practices through their national law
The preferred package generates some one-off costs for businesses. Capping payment terms at 30 days and making the payment of interest mandatory yields one-off adjustment costs for updating standard terms to reflect maximum payment terms (EUR 56.1 million) and adjusted compensation fees (EUR 243 million). However, if both policy options are adopted together, both changes can be made with one adjustment (EUR 243 million). The preferred package imposes on debtors recurring enforcement costs of the automatic payment of compensation (EUR 228.3 million interest, EUR 3.23 billion fees) – a direct benefit for creditors, however – and a recurring enforcement cost of direct regulatory fines (EUR 136.8 million). These costs are avoided completely if companies respect the rules and pay on time. The overall net economic benefit will be positive because cash flows will become more predictable and easier to manage for companies. The administrative costs for main contractors in public works contracts of providing proof of payment to subcontractors amount to EUR 2.2 million for the whole EU.
The preferred option will benefit public authorities in several ways. The main benefit stems from the overall expected reduction in late payments, meaning fewer bankruptcies and associated costs for the public purse. The administrative fines that national enforcement bodies may collect from companies that pay late, estimated at up to EUR 136.8 million, can also help defray the enforcement bodies’ costs. Public authorities should also benefit from the mediation systems envisaged in PO3b, both directly (if the public authority wishes to settle a dispute with a supplier) and indirectly (through relief on the judicial system).
Public authorities will have some costs to bear. Providing access to credit management and financial/digital literacy training entails some adjustment costs, depending on how Member States structure their support, which is why no definitive estimate of costs can be given. Recurring enforcement cost estimates for the automatic payment of compensation interest and fees in government to business (G2B) transactions amount to EUR 37.2 million and EUR 0.53 billion a year respectively. These costs can be avoided by paying on time. The revision of standard contractual conditions to include new compensation fees assumes a cost of EUR 10 per body, as in PO2. Member States that do not have enforcement bodies or mediation systems in place will have to set them up and run them, incurring recurring enforcement costs estimated at EUR 60-65 million a year (enforcement bodies) and EUR 10-40 million a year (mediation services) for the EU. Verifying that subcontractors are paid on time in public works contracts under the Public Procurement Directives is left to Member States’ discretion, in which case a possible recurring enforcement cost would not require additional resources.
This initiative contributes to the achievement of several Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). By contributing indirectly to economic growth, it will create a better business environment in the single market (SDG 8). Stakeholder consultations have confirmed that late payment is the main cause of anxiety and stress and undermines trust in the market. Increasing the availability of and making it easier to access credit management and financial literacy improves quality education (SDG 4). By making things fairer, by increasing SMEs’ access to financial services, including affordable credit, and making it easier for them to integrate into value chains and markets, this revision contributes to the achievement of SDG 9. This revision is compliant with the climate-neutrality objectives of Regulation EU 2021/1119 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 June 2021.
•Regulatory fitness and simplification
The proposed Regulation will simplify matters with a uniform and binding approach to combating late payment, applicable to companies of all sizes, with no exceptional treatment for SMEs. All measures have been conceived of with SMEs in mind, but companies of all sizes will ultimately benefit from them. However, as microenterprises are more affected by late payments than other SMEs, the expected benefits are more likely to materialise as better performance of companies with zero to nine employees.
The benefits of simplification will come from setting strict and uniform payment terms that will result in less time-consuming negotiations. Capping payment terms will diminish the ‘fear factor’ experienced by smaller market players who currently often accept unfair payment terms when dealing with bigger market players. At least 30% of EU SMEs are expected to benefit directly from this provision. Combining the capping of payment terms with deterrents such as making interest and (increased) compensation automatically due, should reduce the number of invoices paid late, as well as significantly reducing the costs associated with the hassle involved in and the time spent chasing up late payers. The number of person-days a year a company spends chasing up late payments has been estimated from 5 days in Germany to over 15 days in Spain 32 . Even based on very conservative assumptions, an annual total of 27.4 million man-hours could be saved for the EU-27 economy, the equivalent of EUR 5 845.4 million, by deterring late payment.
Capping the length of the payment term and the verification procedure will help to make cash flows more predictable. The proposal will also redistribute the financial burden and costs on fair terms, by making sure that each company pays for the liquidity it needs. As matters stand, it is very administratively burdensome for smaller companies, or companies with a weaker market position, to obtain financing at a cost that factors in their level of risk. At the same time, late payments give companies in a less risky position, and for whom it is easier and less costly to obtain financing, hassle-free commercial credit.
Finally, the proposal will make it easier for companies to assert their rights by facilitating access to effective redress through mediation, where currently a judicial procedure is the only available, and often more costly and time-consuming, option. Mediation would allow companies to save EUR 27 million a year in avoided court cases.
•Impact on competitiveness
The proposal is likely to have a positive impact on price/cost and innovation competitiveness. With an increased, more stable and predictable aggregated cash flow, companies have more liquidity to invest in innovation or can pass cost reductions on to consumers. The cost of financing goes down as banks directly finance their own clients’ risks. The proposed initiative would also make the conditions for doing business more predictable, resulting in a more favourable business environment. It is expected to benefit all market players, but to have a greater impact on SMEs than on large companies. Large companies are more likely than SMEs to pay late, so they are more likely to bear some of the costs identified in the preferred policy option.
From an international competitiveness point of view, companies conducting import or export transactions are bound to come up against mismatches in the length of payment terms (between their accounts payable and receivable). Companies will need to manage the risks arising from these mismatches, for example by agreeing with their international partners on the law applicable to the contract, which will define which party is assuming those risks. It is then up to that party to find an appropriate way of funding the mismatch. This is assuming that the risks, including the risk of not being paid, are addressed under market conditions by trade finance providers (by means, for example, of cash in advance, a letter of credit, open accounts or consignments 33 ). These trade finance solutions significantly limit the impact of the introduction of a mandatory cap on payment terms.
The risk that, in international transactions, companies would systematically choose long payment terms under the laws of non-EU countries to undercut companies insisting on EU rules, is also estimated to be limited. Many EU partner countries, such as Canada, the US, Türkiye and the UK, already impose legislation on late payments. This scenario has not really materialised in the EU, where some countries such as the Netherlands have imposed stricter legislation on payments than others.
•ICT developments taken into account
The Late Payment Directive came into force in a world that was significantly less digital. In the 10 years of its implementation, digitalisation has had a profound impact on all aspects of society, including how companies are managed, transforming how companies communicate or market their products and services. This proposal’s measures fit into this contemporary mould and are therefore ‘digital by default’.
Digital tools and solutions play a significant role in some of the proposed measures and will affect their feasibility and cost-effectiveness. This is the case for the obligation to designate bodies responsible for enforcing payment rules. Member States are also asked to encourage SMEs to use digital tools that help getting paid faster, and to make it easier for them to access financial literacy and credit management training, including training on how to use digital payment tools.
•Fundamental rights
The proposal will support the implementation of Article 16 of the Charter of Fundamental rights concerning the freedom to conduct a business. Prompt payments increase trust in the market and spur entrepreneurship.
The proposal is expected to have a certain budgetary impact on Member States. This impact is described in the relevant section of the impact assessment.
The proposal is not expected to affect the EU budget in any way. The current EU Payment Observatory 34 could support the monitoring of the proposal using existing resources.
•Implementation plans and monitoring, evaluation, and reporting arrangements
The degree of success of the initiative will be measured in terms of its reaching these targets:
·reducing by 35% the proportion of companies that report late payments as a problem (progress will be measured against the benchmark value from the 2022 Survey on the Access to Finance of Enterprises for all companies: the target is 28%, from a baseline of 43%);
·reducing by 35% the proportion of companies in each individual size class that report late payments as a problem (progress will be measured against the baseline values from the 2022 Survey on the Access to Finance of Enterprises for size classes (the target is between 26% and 31%, from a baseline of 40% to 47%).
The Commission will monitor and evaluate the impacts of the policy options on late payments, 4 years after the entry into force of the proposed Regulation. The application of EU rules and their impact could be monitored in annual reports produced by Member States on their own initiative, complemented by private sector reports produced by third parties. Such reports usually contain details of payment performance in B2B transactions in Member States and compliance with EU rules, as well as the activity of enforcement authorities in terms of, for example, the number of complaints received and the number of investigations launched. The annual reports should be discussed by the Commission and the national competent authorities. The current EU Payment Observatory could also provide support, in the form of thematic reports, where necessary.
There is more information, including a non-exhaustive list of possible monitoring indicators, in Annex 24 to the Impact Assessment.
•Detailed explanation of the specific provisions of the proposal
Article 1 (Scope) confirms the current scope and clarifies that the regulation will not apply to payments for transactions with consumers, payments made as compensation for damages, payments in relation to debts that are subject to insolvency proceedings, including proceedings that are subject to debt restructuring. The current Late Payment Directive mentions all these exceptions, but this new text makes it clearer by putting them all together in Article 1.
Article 2 (Definitions) keeps most of the current Directive’s definitions, and adds new definitions of the ‘procedure of acceptance or verification’, ‘debtor’ and ‘creditor’.
Article 3 (Payment periods) is stricter than the current Directive’s Articles 3 and 4, by limiting the payment period and the duration of the procedure of acceptance or verification to a maximum of 30 days, and by eliminating any reference to the concept of grossly unfair practices and clauses.
The exceptions for a maximum payment period of 60 days for healthcare and public authorities carrying out economic activities, as set out in Article 4(4)(a) and Article 4(4)(b) of the current Directive, are removed.
The Article explains that the provisions of this Regulation are without prejudice to shorter periods which may be provided for in national law.
Article 4 (Payments to subcontractors in public procurement) is a new provision to support that payments are passed down the supply chain in contracts for public works, by requiring the main contractor to prove that direct subcontractors have been paid.
Article 5 (Interest for late payment) is a new provision. It builds on the provisions in Articles 3 and 4 of the current Directive and clarifies that interest for late payment is automatically due when the necessary conditions are satisfied. It also requires the debtor to give the creditor all the information they need to ensure an invoice can be accepted. This new Article 5 also clarifies that interest for late payment accrues until payment of the principal, in line with case law.
Article 6 (Rate of the interest for late payment) is new. It harmonises the rate of interest for late payment.
Article 7 (Payment schedules) reflects what is in Article 5 of the current Directive.
Article 8 (Compensation for recovery costs) corresponds to Article 6 of the current Directive. It brings lump sum compensation into line with inflation and clarifies that this lump sum is payable for each individual transaction that is paid for late.
Article 9 (Null and void contractual terms and practices) is new. It replaces Article 7 of the current Directive. It removes the concept of ‘grossly unfair’ and lays down a list of practices null and void under the Regulation.
Article 10 (Retention of title) corresponds to Article 9 of the current Directive.
Article 11 (Transparency) corresponds to Article 8 of the current Directive.
Article 12 (Recovery procedures for unchallenged claims) corresponds to Article 10 of the current Directive.
Article 13 (Enforcement authorities) is new. It states that Member States are obliged to designate national authorities responsible for enforcing the Regulation, who are to cooperate with the Commission and with other relevant national enforcement authorities.
Article 14 (Powers of enforcement authorities) is new. It lists the powers enforcement authorities must have to ensure the Regulation is enforced.
Article 15 (Complaints and confidentiality) is new. It sets out the conditions under which creditors and associations of creditors can complain about late payments, as well as the obligations of the enforcement authorities in relation to complaints.
Article 16 (Alternative dispute resolution) is new. It promotes the voluntary use of effective and independent alternative dispute resolution mechanisms for a quicker settlement of disputes between creditors and debtors, without damaging their commercial relationship.
Article 17 (Digital tools, credit management and financial literacy training) is new. Its aim is to ensure the use of digital tools for enforcing the Regulation and the promotion of credit management tools and financial literacy training for SMEs, to reduce late payment.
Article 18 (Report), corresponds to Article 11 of the current Directive, and states that the Commission is to report on the implementation of the Regulation 4 years after its entry into force.
Article 19 (Repeal) is the equivalent of Article 13 of the current Directive, adapted to a Regulation.
Article 20 (Entry into force and application) is the equivalent of Article 14 of the current Directive, adapted to a Regulation.